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Introduction
On 1 April 2005, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 came into force.
This was the culmination of five years' work on the issues facing
transsexual people in the United Kingdom ("UK"). The Act brings to
fruition the work of the Inter-departmental Working Group on Transsexual
People, which the Government established in 1999. It will enable
transsexual people, who have taken decisive steps to live fully and
permanently in their new gender, to apply for full legal recognition of that
gender.!
The new legislation will prevent transsexuals from facing
embarrassing and humiliating incidents where they were forced to reveal
their old gender. Lord Filkin, Minister for the Department for
Constitutional Affairs, welcomed the Act, saying that "for too long
transsexuals people have been denied the rights and responsibilities
appropriate to their acquired gender"? Filkin goes on to use this Act as an
example of the United Kingdom Government's commitment to securing
the rights of minority groups and making a real improvement to the lives
of [transsexual] people. The author disagrees with this comment. The
United Kingdom had, for in excess of thirty years, denied transsexuals the
right to gain full legal recognition, both in the UK courts and the European
Court of Human Right ("ECtHR"), citing the margin of appreciation as
their right to do this. It was not until the United Kingdom Government was
given a stem warning by the Strasbourg judges that they actually
endeavoured to do something and set up the Inter-departmental Group on
Transsexual People. Even then, little was done and the group was re-
convened in 2002 once the ECtHR had finally had enough and determined
that the UK was violating the rights of transsexuals by refusing them full
legal status in their new gender.
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Transsexuals in Legal Exile - The UK Courts
Prior to the Gender Recognition Act, the legal status of both pre- and
post-operative transsexuals in the UK was not specifically defined in any
legislation. It was left to the UK courts to define what status these people
should be given. The position stood for more than three decades after Lord
Ormrod, the former family doctor ("GP") turned justice, gave the now
infamous decision in Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley).3 The case was
about matrimonial affairs and the principle was extended to the criminal
law shortly afterwards in R v Tan. 4
In 1963 Arthur Corbett (the heir to Lord Rowallen) married April
Ashley after a much on-off relationship. Ashley had been born a male but
had undergone sex re-assignment surgery enabling her to fulfil the role of
female. Corbett was well aware of Ashley's background and in fact
brought into the relationship his own cocktail of sexual and emotional
difficulties,s which included his own world of transvestism. Two months
into the marriage Corbett filed for divorce on receiving pressure from his
family to do so. At the time a divorce in the UK could only be granted on
the grounds of adultery or cruelty if evidenced by proof. Mutual consent
was not in issue as Ashley had no desire to be divorced; so, the Rowallen
family had to construct an argument to give a basis for ending the marriage
whilst simultaneously avoiding any inheritance issues. 6 The case
proceeded on the premise that the marriage had never been legal as Ashley
had been born a male and, therefore, remained so. Ashley contested this
and, in the alternative, petitioned for a divorce on the grounds of
incapacity or wilful refusal.
It has long been a principle of marriage in the UK that marriage is a
relationship that can be entered into only between one man and one
woman. In the words of Lord Penzance, marriage is "the voluntary union
for life of one man and one woman".7
This principle has never been denied but there has never been a
definition in English law or in any jurisprudence as to the definition of
what a man and a woman are. In examining the issues of the Corbett case,
] (1970) 2 WLR 1306.
4 (1983) 2 AI! ER 12.
5 S. Edwards, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (Blackstone Press: London, 1996), p.14.
"c. Bums, Campaign Issues (1998), available at www.pfc.org.uk/campaign/pfcissllc.htm.
7 Hyde v Hyde (1866) L.R. 1 P. &0. 130, 135.
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Ormrod J. (as he was then) decided he should use his own experience as a
former OP to grant the legal world a definition. This he did by laying
down a three-tier test. But, before doing so, he commented:
Having regard to the essentially heterosexual character of the
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria must in my
judgement, be biological, for even the most extreme degree of
transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance
which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male
gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is
naturally capable of performing the essential role of a woman in
marriage.
He then concluded:
... the law should adopt in the first place, the first three of the
doctors' criteria, i.e. the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests,
and if all three are congruent, determine the sex for the purpose
of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative intervention.
The fourth of this criteria, the psychological sex, Ormrod felt was
irrelevant in basing a person's sex in law, regardless of the fact that half of
the experts heard in the case acknowledged this as an important criteria
when determining the sex of an individual.
Ormrods' judgement has been criticised constantly since and it is the
present author's view that he erred when suggesting that a male to female
transsexual cannot perform the essential role of a woman in marriage,
without actually defining what this essential role is. If we are to assume
that the essential role of a woman in marriage is the ability to give birth
then this was both an archaic and draconian attitude to take, even in 1970.
There are many women who cannot reproduce who are entitled to marry
and the inability to give birth is and never has been a ground for divorce.
The judgement was also criticised for Ormrod's constant mixing of the
notions of "male and female" with those of "man and woman" as well as
arguing that marriage is based on sex rather than gender.8
8 S. Whittle, "An Association for as Noble a Purpose as any", New Law Journal, March 15. 1996, p.366.
Whittle further comments (at p. 367): "... so he [Orrnrod J] really needed to consider her a 'man' yet almost
certainly Ormrod was faced with a dilemma that arose from his being unable to define the person in front of him
as a man, yet he felt unable, in law and because of the test he had devised, to call her a woman. The sailors who
wrote to April Ashley for pin-ups for their mess room walls had no doubts ... "
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Although the Corbett decision has been criticised for being
responsible for the way the UK deals with transsexuals, it cannot be
forgotten that it only relates to family law and marriage, in particular. R v
Tan and Others extended the principle made by Ormrod J to the criminal
law and sexual offences, especially. It is, therefore, submitted that this case
is just as responsible for the way the law stood. The judgement of Parker J
in the Crown Court extended the Ormrod dictum on sex beyond the
immediate confines of the marriage question to determining sex for the
question of criminal liability.9 Commentary up until this decision had
declared the Corbett judgement as being fully responsible for bringing all
the legal development of the issue in this country to a shuddering halt. 10
This is not disputed but it has to be contended now that it only did so
completely with the help of the Tan judgement. Tan and others dealt with
two sections of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. The first, Section 31, II
states:
It is an offence for a woman for the purposes of gain to exercise
control, direction or influence over a prostitute's movement in
any way which shows she is aiding, abetting or compelling her
prostitution.
The second, Section 30(1),12 provides: "It is an offence for a man
knowingly to live wholly or in part on the earnings of a prostitute."
Gloria Greaves was a male to female transsexual engaged in leasing
premises to prostitutes. Tan was one of these prostitutes who used the
premises for acts of sexual perversion with 'clients'. Greaves was charged,
inter alia, under Section 30(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, which
was a 'male' only offence. Greaves argued that as she was a woman she
could not be charged under this section. Furthermore, Brian Greaves,
Gloria's husband was charged under Section 7 of the same act for living
off the immoral earnings of male prostitution. Edwards makes the point
that, had Gloria Greaves been charged in her postoperative sex, she could
have been charged under s.3l of the Act, which applies to women
9 Edwards. op. cit., p.3l.
10 Annstrong and Walton, "Transsexuals and the Law," (1990) New Law Journal, 140 (6474), 1384, 1389-1390.
"Formerly the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1912, s7 (4).
12 Formerly The Vagrancy Act (1898) sl (1) (a).
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exercising control over prostitutes. 13 Brian Greaves argued that, as Gloria
was a woman, he could not be charged with living off the earnings of a
male prostitute. Parker J delivered the judgement of the court thus:
In our judgement, both common sense and the desirability of
certainty and consistency demand that the decision in Corbett v
Corbett should apply for the purpose not only of marriage but
also a charge under section 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956
or section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967. The same test
would apply also if a man indulged in buggery with another
biological man. That Corbett v Corbett would apply in such a
case was accepted on behalf of the appellant. It would, in our
view, create an unacceptable situation if the law were such that a
marriage, such as Gloria Greaves and another man, was a nullity,
on the ground that Gloria Greaves was a man; that buggery to
which she consented was such that another person could live on
the earnings of a female prostitute without offending against
section 30 of the Act of 1956 because for that purpose he/she was
not a man and that the like position would arise in the case of
someone charged with living on the earnings as a male
. 14prostitute.
Therefore, the court was extending the principle enunciated by
Ormrod to the area of the criminal law. Both April Ashley and Gloria
Greaves, regardless of any medical intervention, were, for the purpose of
UK law, men. The judgement by Parker was widely criticised. 15 It is
interesting to note that Gloria Greaves was released on bail pending appeal
fi ,. 16rom a women s pnson.
Although the UK Courts heard numerous cases (mainly within the
areas of family and criminal law) involving transsexuals, the position
remained the same. For the purposes of English law, a transsexual was
deemed to be of the gender born rather than the acquired gender,
regardless of the hurt and humiliation this attitude would or could cause.
However, in 1986, Mark Anthony Rees, a UK female to male transsexual,
13 Edwards, op cit., p.3!.
14 Ibid., p.32.
15 See the dissenting judgement of Martens J in Cossey.
16 Pace, "Sexual Identity and the Criminal Law," (1983) Crim L. R, 317-321, at 317.
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took his case to the European Court of Human Rights, laying claim that
the reluctance of the UK Government to recognise transsexuals as being of
their acquired gender for legal purposes was a violation of his rights under
the European Convention on Human Rights (the 'Convention').
The European Court of Human Rights
Although Mark Rees was the first UK transsexual to apply to the
ECtHR, the first transsexual to make an application under the Convention
was a Belgian lawyer, Van Oosterwijck (Van Oosterwijck v Belgium
(1980) 3 EHRR 557). This case is responsible for identifying the problems
that so many transsexuals faced when a state refused to recognise the new
gender on birth certificates. Van Oosterwijck argued that, as Belgian law
forced him to carry legal identification everywhere, his rights were being
violated under Articles 8 and 12, respectively.
Article 8 states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
Van Oosterwijck was born a girl and his civil status card reflected
this. He applied to have his birth certificate amended to reflect the new
gender as he daily had to disclose to third parties the fact that he was born
female. Prior to this, several transsexuals had had their birth certificates
amended in Belgium. Van Oosterwijck found himself being refused an
amendment, the authorities stating medical reasons as justification. As a
lawyer, Van Oosterwijck was aware of the Convention and made an
application. He also alleged that, by refusing an amendment to his birth
certificate, they were violating his right to marry and found a family as his
sex change had ensured he could no longer marry a man.
Article 12 of the Convention provides: "Men and women of
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according
26
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to the national laws governing the exercise of this right." Before the
European Commission ("the Commission"), speaking on his own behalf,
Van Oosterwijck stated some of the difficulties he had encountered, such
as what name would appear on his certificate for graduating in law from
the University of Brussels and, once he had entered into the bar, what
name was going to appear on the list. He informed those before him that
he was struggling for his life:
... I became aware of the existence of this problem when I was
five. I appear before you today at the age of thirty-five. Not to
overturn case law, but for the right to lead a normal life. 17
The Commission found that Van Oosterwijck's rights under Article 8
had been violated and, in also finding a violation of Article 12, stated:
Although marriage and the family are in fact associated in the
convention and in domestic legal systems, there is nothing to
support the conclusion that the capacity to procreate is an
essential condition of marriage or even that procreation is an
essential purpose of marriage.
Apart from the fact that a family can always be founded by the
adoption of children, it should be noted in this connection that, although
impotence is sometimes considered a ground for nullity, this is not
generally the case as regards sterility. 18 However, the court refused to hear
the case on its merits, as Van Oosterwijck had not exhausted all domestic
remedies.
The comment on Article 12 by the Commission was noted because six
years later Mark Anthony Rees presented the ECtHR with virtually the
same facts. The application was, inter alia, under Article 12. Ignoring the
Commission's views in Van Oosterwijck, the ECtHR found no violation
and astonishingly was unanimous in its opinion.
Rees v UK19 was heard in the Strasbourg court in October 1986. The
decision handed down from the Commission in the Van Oosterwijck case
had given him the encouragement to take his own case. Rees argued that
17 Van Oosterwijck (1980), cited in Edwards, op. cit., 1995 pAl.
" Van Oosterwijck (1980), cited in D. Gomien et 01, Law and Practice olthe European Convention on Human
Rights and the European Social Charter (Council of Europe Publishing: Strasbourg, 1996), p.256.
19 (1987) 9 EHRR 56.
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his own case was indistinguishable from Van Oosterwijck as he, too, was
facing embarrassment in that production of his birth certificate was needed
in a wide variety of situations and that, furthermore, without amendment to
his birth certificate, he was forced to disclose private information to third
parties, i.e., the fact that he was born a female, effectively constituting a
violation of Article 8. On the subject of Article 12, Rees argued that
although he was free to marry a person of the sex opposite to that assigned
to him at birth, he was " ...psychologically, biologically and socially
unable to do SO".20
Although the court accepted that the UK did owe a duty to Rees with
respect to Article 8, it noted that Rees' life as a transsexual had already
been facilitated to some extent by official action. His treatment and
surgery had been obtained under the National Health Service and some of
his official documents had been issued in his new name with an indication
of his post-operative sex. The Court held that the refusal to alter a birth
certificate could not be considered an interference with private life and, as
there was no general consensus amongst the Member States of the Council
of Europe, the UK enjoyed a wide 'margin of appreciation'.
But, Rees sought, not only an amendment to his birth certificate but
also, a provision that any amendment be kept secret from third parties. The
court held that Article 8 could not be interpreted so widely as to require
the UK to introduce detailed legislation to cover this kind of situation.
With regard to Article 12, the court also found no violation, stating that
marriage refers to the traditional notion of marriage between two persons
of opposite biological sexes and that Article 12 was mainly concerned with
protecting marriage as a basis of family life. Furthermore the court
accepted, impliedly, the reasoning in Corbett that biological sex is
determined at birth. The court dismissed Rees' argument that he was not in
the position to marry a man2l and concluded that he was in fact free to do
just that.
Although this dealt a bitter blow for transsexuals, some academics in
the UK were positive, believing that legislative reforms would be in place
shortly.22 Four years later both the UK and European courts were given the
opportunity to evaluate the position of transsexuals in UK law.
20 Rees v UK (1986) EHRR Series A no. 106.
2! See above.
22 E.g., see Bradney, op. cit., p.351.
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Cossey v UK23 raised identical issues to Rees. Caroline Cossey was a
male to female transsexual who was enjoying a successful career as model/
actress. Cossey claimed that, as a consequence of the UK not allowing an
amendment to her birth certificate, she was prevented from marrying a
man. Cossey claimed this was an infringement of her rights under the
Convention and made an application under Article 8, 12 and 14. The court
once again held that there had been no violation but there was an increase
in the dissenting judges. Rees had lost by 12 votes to 3 on Article 8 and
unanimously on Article 12. Cossey lost by 10 to 8 on Article 8 and 14 to 4
on Article 12.
The court accepted that it was not bound by its previous judgements
and that, although it generally did follow its own decisions, where there
were cogent reasons for departing from those decisions, they would do so.
But, the court concluded that this was not the case on the basis of
examination of scientific and societal changes. They were of the opinion
that there was nothing in this case to distinguish it from Rees.
Concerning Article 8 and the altering of the birth certificate, the
court held that regard must be had to the fair balance between the general
interests of the community and the interests of the individual. Furthermore,
it was held that sex re-assignment surgery did not amount to a complete
change of sex and, therefore, any alteration to the birth certificate would
be incorrect.
With regard to Article 12, the Court noted that the right to marry was
not impeded so much as to undermine its existence. Although some states
allowed marriages between two people of the same biological sex, this was
not consistent enough to warrant deviation from the traditional notion of
marriage.
The dissenting judgements are of particular interest. Judge Martens
for example, while acceding to the fact that Cossey was indistinguishable
from Rees, opined that the Court in Rees got it wrong. He suggested that
the Court should rectify this error in the present case. Martens noted the
long, dangerous and painful treatment transsexuals were put through in
order to adapt to the sex they were convinced they belonged to. For the
law to refuse to acknowledge its change for legal purposes was "simply
cruel". Commenting on the margin of appreciation given to the UK in both
Rees and Cossey, he stated that this was not a matter of right, but of
judicial restraint. Additionally, where individual rights were violated, then
2J (1991) 13 EHRR 622.
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no margin of appreciation should be given other than on how and in what
form measures should be taken to rectify the infringement.
The dissenting judgement of Judge Palm gave reference to the
Resolutions that had taken place. The European Parliament on 12
September 198924 and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe25 had both adopted Resolutions recommending the re-classification
of the sex of the post-operative transsexual and calling upon Member
States:
... to enact provlSlons on Transsexuals' right to change sex by
endocrinological, plastic surgery and cosmetic treatment, on the
procedure, and banning discrimination against them.26
If we add the above resolutions to the fact that, at the time of Cossey,
the number of member states, which recognised, for legal purposes, re-
assignment of sex, had increased to fourteen,27 then it is clear that
important societal developments had taken place.
A note has to be made regarding Caroline Cossey's position and the
UK's insistence that the birth certificate is the retainer of historical facts
and should not be amended unless the facts prove to be wrong. In reality
the birth certificate remains a tool of everyday life. Prospective employers,
life assurance companies, motor insurance companies, both the civil and
criminal courts and pension providers all request sight of birth certificates.
Even though the UK Government stresses that the birth certificate should
not be used as identification, the reality is that life insurance and motor
insurance companies will want to see it to check age and gender for
actuarial purposes. The courts, whether you are a defendant or claimant,
will require it to establish your age and gender. Pension companies require
it to check for retirement dates. If Caroline Cossey worked a 9-5 job, will
she not be faced daily with embarrassment when she has to continue work
for a further five years upon reaching the age of 60? What is more, the
Government contradicts itself by saying that it is not a form of identity and
yet uses it as such when, for example, a death certificate is being drawn
up. So, in reality the birth certificate is a daily tool if stating a gender
24 OJ C256/33 (9 October 1989).
25 Recommendation 1117 (1989).
2h Cited in Edwards, 1996 p. 41.
27 Walton, "A Measure of Appreciation," (1992) New Law Journal, 142 (6566), 1202-1204, at 1203.
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opposite to that of the person holding it will cause daily distress. These
points are as relevant today as they were then.
Yet, the court was not addressed with these points and Cossey,
therefore, remained "good law", at least as far as transsexuals in the UK
were concerned. It was another six years before the ECtHR was given the
opportunity to end the humiliation and distress caused to UK transsexuals.
Although technically distinguishable from Rees and Cossey, X Y and Z28
involved Stephen Whittle, a law lecturer and Vice President of Press For
Change,29 his wife and their first child. The case was of high profile and it
was expected that this time transsexuals would at last win and the UK
would be forced to adopt measures granting them full legal status in the
gender chosen.
x; YandZv UK
Stephen Whittle (X), a female to male transsexual, and Sarah
Rutherford (Y), have been living together as a couple since 1979. They
have four children born from Artificial Insemination by Donor ("AID").
The case concerned the request of X to be registered as the father on the
birth certificate of their eldest daughter (Z). X has been living and working
as a man since 1975 although he did not have sex re-assignment surgery
until 1979.
After living together for 11 years, X and Y decided they wanted to
start a family. They applied for AID and were initially refused. However,
in November 1991 a hospital ethics committee agreed to provide the
treatment requested for X, and Y underwent extensive counselling and,
after the doctors had decided that it was appropriate and in the best
interests of any child born, X was asked to acknowledge himself as the
legal and social father of the child within the meaning of the Human
Fertility and Embryology Act 1990. That Act provides, inter alia, that,
where an unmarried woman gives birth as a result of AID with the
involvement of her male partner, the latter, rather than the donor of the
sperm, shall be treated for legal purposes as the father of the child.30
On 13 October 1992 Z was born. X and Y then attempted to register
the child in their joint names as father and mother, respectively. They
were prevented from registering X as the father on account of him being
28 Judgement of 22 April 1997, Reports of judgements and Decisions - II (1997) 24 EHRR 238.
29 A campaign group to promote the rights of transsexuals.
30 Section 28(3).
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assigned a female on his own birth certificate. That part of the register
was left blank although they allowed Z to be given the surname of X.
The family made an application to Strasbourg on behalf of
themselves and Z, arguing that the prevention of X being named on the
birth certificate of Z was a violation of the right to privacy under Article 8.
Furthermore, they argued that the refusal stigmatised the whole family and
Z in particular, and removed basic parental rights from X. Y claimed that
the action infringed her right to choose the father of her child under Article
12. X also claimed that he was discriminated against under Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 8 by virtue of sex.
A grand chamber of 20 judges heard the case. Maybe it was an
omen, but, just before the case was heard, Judge Martens, long an
advocate of transsexual rights, was taken ill and replaced by the Greek
Judge, Valticos, who unfortunately, had decided against the transsexual in
every case he had heard.
The UK Government contended in the first place that no family ties
existed between the applicants. However, the court unanimously held that
Article 8 was applicable in this case as they considered de facto family ties
did exist between the applicants. The notion of family life could include
different relevant factors that covered a couple who had demonstrated their
commitment to each other by having children together or by any other
means.
Once the family had been established, the court then distinguished
the present case from Rees and Cossey in that it raised different problems
such as granting parental rights to transsexuals, particularly, in the form of
AID. However, they proceeded on the basis that there was little common
ground amongst the Member States of the European Council as regards
parental rights and, in particular, as to whether any non-biological father
should be recorded on the birth certificate of a child born from AID. As a
result of this, the UK was to be given a wide margin of appreciation. They,
therefore, held by a majority of 14 to 6 that the UK had not contravened
Art. 8 and, furthermore, that it was not necessary to examine the same
issues under Article 14.
At first sight the judgement seems a sensible one. There is in fact no
general consensus on parental rights within Europe. It is a reasonable
argument that a community will have a large interest in maintaining a
coherent system of family law that places the best interests of the child as
paramount. But, the court went on to say that any change in the system
might have undesirable or unforeseen ramifications on a child, placed in
the position of Z, and could not be accepted without further elaboration.
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Neither the court nor the UK Government offered any example of this. It
is, therefore, difficult to see how Z could have suffered from having X as
her father on her birth certificate.
The court commented that any amendments may have other
implications. For example, family law might be a shambles if, on the one
hand, it recognised X as the father of Z on her birth certificate, whilst
simultaneously barring him from marriage to Y on account of only being
recognised as of the sex assigned on his birth certificate, i.e. female.
However, it is felt that the court missed the real point here because any
ambiguity in the law would have been caused by the UK's constant refusal
to recognise X as a man for legal purposes. In other words, if the UK
Government had not been so inflexible but had admitted that they were
wrong in denying a transsexual the right to be recognised in any new
gender chosen, then that chosen gender would have been the applicable
one for the whole of the law, thereby preventing any ambiguity.
The dissenting judgements were probably the correct ones. Judges
Casadevall, Russo and Makarcyz argued that, as the UK Government,
firstly, allowed X to have sex re-assignment surgery and, secondly,
allowed Y to have fertility treatment for which X was obligated to
acknowledge paternity, they are obligated to take all measures necessary,
without discrimination, to allow the applicants to live a normal life.
Unfortunately, they failed to take account of Article 14 after implying that
X was discriminated against. The rest of the dissenters, however, did not
dismiss article 14. Judges Thor Vi1hjalmsson, Foighel and Gotchev, in
three separate dissents, all found a violation of both Articles 8 and 14.
Thor Vi1hjalmsson took cognisance of the fact that, had X been born
a man, he would have been allowed to register himself as the father of Z.
Yet, as a result of him being a transsexual and assigned the role of female,
he was not allowed.
Foighel made reference to Cossey, where he also dissented, in that
the court in that case commented that it must follow any future medical,
social and moral developments in the area. He correctly pointed out that
the majority ignored these.
Gotchev approached the case from a different angle, arguably the
most reasonable. He argued that the welfare of the child was paramount
and that the UK Government was under an obligation to the child to ensure
integration into the family, which would surely include recognising X as
the father of Z on the child's birth certificate.
It is the present author's opinion that the court erred here on two
grounds. Firstly, this case should not have been distinguished from Rees
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and Cossey. The reason for the case being brought was that X was not
being recognised on his own birth certificate as a male. Had he been
recognised in his new gender, no case would have arisen. This case,
therefore, should be deemed an extension of Rees and Cossey. X, Yand Z
illustrated more circumstances where the UK's refusal to amend birth
certificates was causing problems in addition to those shown by Rees and
Cossey earlier. Secondly, the court should take another look at the use of
Article 14. Is there really any reason to have to use it in conjunction with a
substantive Article? Even if one was to accept that there was no violation
of Article 8, the fact remains that X was discriminated against on grounds
of sex because, had he been assigned a male at birth, he would have been
allowed to register himself as the father; yet, as a result of his birth
certificate showing him to be a female at birth, he was prevented from
doing so. This is a clear violation of rights and is, thus, questionable.
Although the decision dealt a bitter blow to UK transsexuals, one of
the applicants, Stephen, remained positive and believed the dissenting
judgements gave hope. 31 Not all transsexuals were as positive, though.
Christine Bums was particularly scathing:
...Stop and think for a moment about X's position ifY were to die
or merely become incapacitated... and then think how any parent
would feel to live in the shadow of that uncertainty. Remember
that X is unable to marry Y either. .. and think of the effects
which that has on both his and the children's financial
security... Think about ... everyday consequences too. In law X
has no legal right to an interest in his children's education. If the
children require hospital treatment there is a question mark over
whether he can give consent to drugs or surgery. Every direction
he turns in is a cruel reminder that his role as both a father and as
. d . 32
a man IS un er questIOn.
She added the following scathing words for the UK government:
What sorts of monsters insist on perpetuating this kind of mental
cruelty? Well curiously, they say they're concerned for the
31 Whittle, ECHRfails to take on board transsexuals issues (1997); available at
www.pfc.org.uk/legallcchranal.htm.
32 Burns, op. cit.
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future of "the family". But if that's the case then they have a
strange and warped way of expressing that concern.33
It was not long before the Strasbourg court was given the opportunity
to hear the next application from the transsexual community.
Sheffield and Horsham v UK34
This case differed again from all those before it, but only on the
circumstances. It was the first transsexual case before the court involving
two transsexuals, both male to female. It also differed in that one of the
applicants had dual nationality. Rachael Horsham had been born in the
UK, but had lived in Holland for nearly three decades during which time
she received citizenship and entered into a valid marriage in Holland. It
was also the first time the court was faced with a transsexual applicant
claiming violation of Article 13 as well as Articles 8, 12 and 14.
Article 13 reads:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
Kristina Sheffield was born in 1946 and registered at birth a male.
Sheffield differed from Rees and company in that, as a male, she had been
married and fathered a child. Her occupation at the time was that of pilot.
In 1986 Sheffield underwent sex re-assignment surgery, but not before
having the marriage dissolved. The applicant's former spouse successfully
applied to have Sheffield's contact with her daughter terminated and
Sheffield had not seen her since, some 12 years ago.
Rachael Horsham, too, born in 1946, was registered a male at birth.
She left the UK in 1971, in fear of being identified as a transsexual, to live
in Holland.35 In 1992 Horsham underwent sex re-assignment surgery at the
Free University Hospital in Amsterdam.
33 Ibid
34 Judgement ono July 1998, Reports ood Decisions of1998 (1999) 27 EHRR 163.
35 It would be interesting to discover whether the media attention to April Ashley around the same time had
anything to do with this.
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A full chamber of twenty judges heard the case. They once again
found that the UK had not violated Article 8, but this time by the slimmest
of majorities: 11-9. They also ruled by a majority of 18-2 that no violation
of Article 12 had taken place, with a unanimous ruling against violation of
either Article 13 or Article 14.
The court held that the applicants had not shown that since the
Cossey case there had been enough medical findings to settle conclusively
the aetiology of transsexualism. They also dismissed the research report,
proffered by Liberty Amicus, stating (at para. 57):
... the Court is not fully satisfied that the legislative trends
outlined by amicus suffice to establish the existence of any
common European approach to the problems created by the
recognition in law of post-operative gender status. In particular,
the survey does note that there is not as yet any common
approach as to how to address the repercussions which the legal
recognition of a change of sex may entail.
The court accepted that the incidents illustrated by Sheffield and
Horsham were embarrassing enough to cause distress. However, they
stressed that there must be occasions which would justify proof of gender
as well as medical history. Nevertheless, they went on to say (at para.59):
... apart from these considerations the situations in which the
applicants may be required to disclose their pre-operative gender
do not occur with a degree of frequency which could be said to
impinge to a disproportionate extent on their right to respect for
their private lives.
They did, however, find it necessary to criticise the UK government for
their lack of action in this area. On this issue they reiterated the point,
made by the court in both Rees and Cossey, about the importance of
keeping the need for appropriate legal measures under review, having
regard, in particular, to scientific and societal development. The court
noted that the UK government had made no attempts to follow those
instructions. They further pointed out that, although a UK transsexual is
able to record his/her new sexual identity on certain documents such as
passports and driving licenses or change their name at will, these were not
innovative facilities as they were able to be done even at the time of Rees,
some eleven years previously.
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Although the court dismissed the view that there had been enough
scientific development in the aetiology of transsexualism, they did accept
that there had been an "increased social acceptance of transsexualism and
an increased recognition of the problems post-operative transsexuals
encounter".36
The British judge, Sir John Freeland, although voting in favour of
the UK, accepted that Sheffield and Horsham had illustrated a wider range
of situations in which difficulty and embarrassment were caused to post-
operative transsexuals in the UK than had been illustrated in Rees and
Cossey. Admitting that he hesitantly ruled in favour of his home state, he
implied that next time the UK Government might find themselves in
violation of the Convention.
Judges Bernhadt, Thor Vilhjamsson, Spielman, Palm, Wilhaber,
Makarczcyk and Voicu disagreed with the majority and were of the
opinion that important developments had taken place with regards to both
medical and societal learning but the UK had stood still, refusing to even
review the situation. Referring to the Liberty Amicus Brief, they were
convinced that the research conducted illustrated that the problems of
transsexuals were being addressed in a dignified and respectful way by a
large number of Member States. Furthermore, they suggested that the
court should not wait until every Member State had amended its law on
transsexuals before deciding that Article 8 should give rise to a positive
obligation to introduce reform.
Pointing to the report drawn by Liberty, illustrating that the UK was
then one of only four Member States to have done nothing on the issue, the
dissenters said:
... how can we expect uniformity in such a complex area where
legal change will necessarily take place against the background
of the States' traditions and cultures? However, the essential
point is that in these countries, unlike in the United Kingdom,
change has taken place - whatever its precise form - in an
attempt to alleviate the distress and suffering of the post-
operative transsexual and that there exists in Europe a general
trend which seeks in differing ways to confer recognition on
the altered sexual identity.3?
36 Para. 60 of the judgement, ante.
37 See joint, partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bemhadt, Thor Vilhjamsson, Spielman, Palm, Wilhaber,
Makarczcyk and Voicu.
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The judgement gave much hope to UK transsexuals38 and it seemed
clear that the court was making headway towards their goal. But, one
cannot help but feel that the applicants should have won this case in any
event. It must be noted that the court, in its own judgement, "moved the
goalposts". The UK was given a wide margin of appreciation in Rees and
Cossey as a result of there being no general trend in Member States on
legislation for transsexuals. Yet, when there was finally evidence of this,
as the report by Liberty illustrated, the majority then claimed that there
was no consensus on how the States approached the area. This, in
agreement with the minority, is not the point. The fact is that there is a
growing trend, as shown by Cossey and Rees and, so, it is felt that the
majority erred on this point.
The Strasbourg court was given yet another opportunity to resolve the
desperate plight of UK transsexuals in 2002. Sixteen years after hearing
the humiliation caused to Mark Anthony Rees, the Strasbourg judges
finally decided "enough was enough". Goodwin v UK39 (and the parallel
case of I v United Kingdom40) represented a historical landmark for UK
transsexuals.
Goodwin v United Kingdom
Christine Goodwin was a post-operative male to female transsexual.
Like many of the previous transsexual applicants, she provided evidence
of an array of situations, where the UK's refusal to grant full legal status to
a transsexual in their new gender was causing distress. Some of these,
although existing hypothetically in the earlier cases, had not been
presented to the court before. Issues such as pensions, retirement age, etc.,
had been cited before the court on previous occasions, but one issue
identified a great travesty not heard in any of the previous cases by the
court in relation to transsexuals. In 1992 Ms Goodwin had claimed she
was being sexually harassed and was ultimately dismissed, she argued, as
a result of her transsexuality. She tried to pursue the case in the Industrial
Tribunal (as it was then), but claimed she was unsuccessful because she
was considered in law to be a man. It is the author's contention that, facing
38 See below.
34 28957/95 [2002] I.R.L.R. 664 (ECHR).
40 Application No. 25680/94 July 11,2002.
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the numerous embarrassing situations cited is one thing, but being denied
access to justice as a result of being transsexual is another.
This time, the ECtHR were not lenient with the UK Government and
found that there had been a violation of Article 8, determining that the
Government had failed to comply with its positive obligation to guarantee
the applicant's right to respect for her private life, in particular, by failing
to give legal recognition to her gender re-assignment.
Although the decision is a welcome one, it must be stated that there
was no reason why the court could not have come to their conclusions
earlier. For example, the court pointed out that, as the United Kingdom
authorised the treatment and surgery needed to alleviate the condition of
gender dysphoria, it would be illogical to refuse full legal recognition of
this. However, this was the position for Mark Rees in 1986. Treatment was
available on the NHS then and continues to be available. Why did the
Strasbourg court take 16 years to determine that providing the surgery and
then denying a legal recognition of that surgery was illogical?
The ECtHR again used the services of Liberty as they had done in
Sheffield and Horsham. The Amicus Brief provided by Liberty showed no
change in Europe since its previous report and yet the court attached great
importance to "the clear international trend in favour not only of increased
social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual
identity of post-operative transsexuals". However, this growing trend was
illustrated in 1998 in Sheffield and Horsham.
The Court also took the view that there were no significant factors of
public interest to weigh against the interest of the applicant in obtaining
full legal recognition in her new gender. Again, it is difficult to see how
this was different from previous cases. As in all previous applications, the
UK had argued that this issue fell within the margin of appreciation. On
each of the other occasions the Court accepted that. However, this time the
court found the opposite: that the UK Government could no longer claim
that the matter fell within their margin of appreciation.
The Strasbourg court also deemed that the applicant's rights had
been violated under Article 12, opining that the reference to "men and
women" in Article 12 could not be assumed to refer exclusively to the
birth gender of individuals. Dismissing the UK Government's claim that
this matter also fell within the margin of appreciation, the Court implied
that there was no justification for barring a transsexual from marriage
under any circumstances.
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Conclusion
It is apparent, therefore, that the Strasbourg Court has now
abandoned its cautious approach and rightly held the view that the lack of
legal recognition of transsexuals by the UK Government no longer falls
under the umbrella of a margin of appreciation. However, is it a failure of
the ECtHR to take 16 years to remove the protection afforded to the UK?
When Mark Anthony Rees became the first UK transsexual
applicant to present a case before the ECtHR in 1986, very little was
known about transsexualism and it is understandable that Ormrod's
criteria, as set out in Corbett v Corbett in 1970, was used as the backbone
to afford the UK leniency. Additionally, it will be remembered that, at the
time, the Court pointed out that the UK did already facilitate the position
of transsexuals by allowing both treatment and surgery under the National
Health Service and allowing a change of name on certain documents, for
example, on passports. However, it must be contended that even at that
point the UK Government had confused matters by allowing Gloria
Greaves to spend time on remand in a women's prison after insisting that
legally she was still a man under UK law.
By the time Caroline Cossey appeared before the Court in
Strasbourg in 1991, the rest of Europe had started to wake up to the plight
of transsexuals. Both scientific and social changes were being discovered,
but not enough, according to the ECtHR, to warrant a departure from Rees.
Caroline Cossey had raised identical issues to Mark Rees. However,
it was apparent that a number of the Strasbourg judges were uncomfortable
with the Rees decision. The UK government had won by the smallest of
margins possible in the case (10-8). Although there still appeared no real
general consensus on the issue amongst member states, the European
Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had
passed Resolutions urging member states to enact provisions on
transsexual rights and to ban discrimination against them. The ECtHR
failed UK transsexuals by not placing more emphasis on the Resolutions.
Although X Y and Z was technically distinguishable from Rees and
Cossey, it must be submitted that, in reality, the principle remained the
same. All that this case illustrated by way of difference, was that Stephen
Whittle argued different circumstances, where the UK's refusal to
acknowledge legal recognition of a transsexual's new gender was causing
a detriment to the transsexual. However, in the case it was not just the
transsexual who was affected, but also his family, including a young child
who wanted to have a legally recognised father on her birth certificate. The
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present author believes this to be ironic as UK family law has, for several
years now, placed the interests of children as paramount. The ECtHR's
reasoning, that a change in the law would provide ambiguity in UK law,
was weak in that they failed to recognise that an ambiguity would be
caused only by the UK's refusal to acknowledge Whittle as a man.
Whilst it is accepted that the absence of a general consensus in
Europe on a particular issue can grant the member state concerned a
margin of appreciation, surely the court was under an obligation to respect
any consensus as negating the right to afford the member state its margin.
In Sheffield and Horsham, Liberty provided a report illustrating that only
four member states did not provide some type of mechanism allowing the
transsexual to be legally recognised in their chosen gender: Albania,
Andorra, Ireland and the UK. However, it is contended that again the
Court failed by insisting on any consensus illustrating a similar approach
in how provisions were implemented. This was not something that the
court had insisted on previously; to have expected similarity in how
Member States implemented provisions seemed ludicrous, given the social
and cultural differences between the states. It should only have been
necessary to show that provisions were made. The form and method
should have been entirely up to the state. The report was produced for a
second time in the case of Christine Goodwin and, although nothing had
actually changed, the court, this time, took a different view.
Goodwin v UK, it can be argued, added very little to the cases heard
before, other than highlighting even more situations where the UK's
refusal to legally recognise a transsexual in their new gender was causing
distress. The situations, that Goodwin presented to the ECtHR, were
present even in Rees and Cossey. However, although the court could only
deal with the evidence put before it, one must wonder why the lawyers,
acting on behalf of Rees and Cossey, did not address these issues. They
were obvious enough, even in 1986 and 1991. Returning to the Amicus
brief presented by Liberty to the court in Sheffield and Horsham, the report
was updated and presented in Goodwin. However, as far as Europe was
concerned, there was absolutely no change. This time, though, the report
also covered states that were not a party to the Convention. Furthermore,
in condemning the UK for lack of action, the ECtHR erred as the UK had,
indeed, put together the Inter-departmental Working Group on
Transsexuals' Rights after Sheffield and Horsham (although the group did
little before re-convening after the decision in Goodwin).
All in all, very little was presented to the ECtHR in Goodwin that
had not been argued before, even if only in principle. With such weak
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jurisprudence coming from the ECtHR, it must be concluded that the court
had decided enough was enough and, after the stem warning, handed out
by Sir John Freedland in Sheffield and Horsham, the UK Government
could not seriously have hoped to win this case.
It took 34 years, numerous cases in the UK courts, seven cases in
Strasbourg and the introduction of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 for
UK transsexuals, finally, to win the rights and freedom they had fought so
persistently for: the right to be legally recognised in their chosen gender
and the freedom, like everyone else, to slip quietly into the crowd.
Paul Kavanagh
Southampton Solent University
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